Economic history : A tale f two Virginias : the economics of West Virginia's secession by Stephen Slivinski
O
n April 17, 1861, the conven-
tion called by the Virginia
General Assembly to con-
sider secession from the Union met
in secret in Richmond. This meeting
was viewed with suspicion by some
attendees — namely, many members
of the delegation from the western
counties of Virginia. When the final
vote was tallied, the secession measure
had passed: 88 to 55. At the conven-
tion, most of the “no” votes came
from 32 delegates from what we know
today as West Virginia, mainly from
the northern, western, and central
parts. 
Three days after the convention
adjourned, 22 of the delegates opposed
to Virginia’s secession found them-
selves in another secret meeting to
contemplate another secession. The
site of the meeting was the room of
Sherrard Clemens at the Powhatan
Hotel near the capitol. Clemens was a
U.S. congressman who was famous for
challenging the governor’s son to a
duel in 1859 over actions taken during
a gubernatorial race. (He sustained 
a near-fatal wound then.) The atten-
dees of the Powhatan Hotel meeting
decided they would “oppose secession
to the last,” wrote Charles Ambler, 
one of the most
prominent histori-
ans of this period.
And they also went
one step further:
They agreed that it
was time to pro-
mote secession of
the western coun-
ties of Virginia —
or, at least, as many
of them as possible
— from the Old
Dominion and cast their lot with 
the Union. 
This was not a rash decision but
instead the peak of an emerging 
“sectionalism” that saw the western
counties as too unique to fit with 
the rest of Virginia. Part of the differ-
ence was from attitudes over the
morality of slavery. Another was
demographic — the ethnic composi-
tion of the new immigrants to the
western counties was different than
that of the eastern ones.
The main divergence was largely
over economic issues. Many within the
western counties viewed the attitudes
and policies supported by many in
Virginia as inhospitable to the pros-
perity of non-slaveholder farmers and
businesses. Ambler makes the case
that the split was inevitable in his his-
tory of the period. Historian Barbara
Rasmussen notes: “West Virginia
statehood was long in the making and
had its start in politics driven by 
economic interests, not abolition.” 
The Seeds of Secession
The economic differences between
the western counties that eventually
seceded from Virginia and the rest of
the state were long-standing and based
on a series of specific factors. The 
economic differences that arose from
western Virginia’s unique geography
were indeed large factors. These 
western and northwestern areas 
of Virginia were mountainous and
rugged, and winters came early. 
None of this made the area conducive
to the production of tobacco, a cash
crop for the eastern counties. The
plantation system that was typical 
of tobacco farming never took hold
and, as such, neither did widespread
slave ownership. The counties were
instead characterized by collections of
yeoman farmers.
Some of the wealth generated after
1812 also came from the mining of 
natural resources. The production of
salt was lucrative, and later came the
dominance of iron and coal mining.
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What we know today as the state of West
Virginia used to be 55 counties that were
part of Virginia. By the Civil War, the
economic and demographic differences
between many of these counties and the
rest of the Old Dominion had become so
pronounced that the secession was seen 









































SOn the farms, hogs, corn for whiskey, sheep, apples, and 
lumber were the main agricultural emphasis. And having 
the Ohio River along their western border gave the 
western counties of Virginia better initial access to 
the interior waterways of America to transport all of their
products — an endeavor made all the more profitable by the
invention of the steamboat. 
The demographics of the western counties also differed
from those of eastern Virginia. Scotch-Irish and German
immigrants tended to move west to where the nonslave jobs
were. Many other workers also moved west, mainly from
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York and New England —
none of which had ingrained loyalties or ties to the Old
Dominion. Meanwhile, the eastern counties were largely
characterized by bloodlines that could be traced to original
colonists and over the ocean to England. As historian
Charles Ambler wrote in his classic 1904 work, Sectionalism
in Virginia from 1776 to 1861, as population moved westward
and became more diverse in nationality, the “contrasts and 
conflicts between the older and newer societies became
more pronounced.”
One of the most pronounced differences was over the
issue of slavery. In addition to the relatively small benefit 
of slave labor in the more mountainous counties, the 
new immigrant population tended to be religiously and 
ideologically opposed to slavery. Couple that with the afore-
mentioned lack of slaves in the western counties generally,
and it is easy to see the budding schism. Such was identified
at the time by many Virginia residents, including those 
in the slaveholding eastern counties, like the areas of 
the Tidewater along the Chesapeake Bay.  
Yet, as volatile as the slavery issue was — and although
there was indeed a small enslaved population in the western
counties — other pressing political questions had a more
direct economic influence on the western counties. Of 
primary importance in the early 19th century was access to
capital. At that time, the only two legally chartered banks in
all of Virginia were located in Richmond. Coins issued by
these banks were too scarce to serve as a suitable medium 
of exchange out west. So private citizens created unincorpo-
rated banks to issue notes, which circulated freely based on
the reputation of the issuer. 
After petitioning the state legislature to open some 
western banks, the legislature agreed to charter banks in
Winchester and Wheeling in 1817. Yet other banking centers
— Baltimore, Pittsburgh, and Philadelphia, in particular —
had already gained a foothold in the region and continued 
to fund much of the commercial activity afterward.
While the western counties became more prosperous
and populous, the political dynamic in matters of East versus
West was dictated by a political system that Thomas
Jefferson noticed as early as 1790 was unbalanced. The
imbalance was driven largely by a voting system that gave
more weight to slaveholding counties. The attempt to
address the inequities resulted in a constitutional conven-
tion in 1830. But the outcome was not to change the
apportionment rules that favored slave owners. Instead, the
agreement added more seats to the state’s Senate and House
which were awarded arbitrarily to the western counties. 
This hardly ended the sectional strife. In fact, it set off a
short-lived and unsuccessful movement among the northern
panhandle counties to consider a merger with Pennsylvania. 
Another important sectional conflict is illustrated after
the advent of rail travel. The Baltimore and Ohio Company
wanted to extend their railroad through Virginia, heading
west to the Ohio River by passing through the Kanawha
River valley. The General Assembly was concerned about the
proposed route running too far south and causing the state
to lose trade coming from the west as it could be rerouted to
Baltimore and Philadelphia instead. So they initially vetoed
the request of the railroad. They opted instead to support
other projects — both rail and waterway — that they 
reasoned would direct more trade eastward toward
Richmond and Norfolk. 
Instead, the B&O Railroad eventually extended west out
of Washington, D.C., through Cumberland, Md., and back
into what is now West Virginia. Over time, it made cities
along its route, such as Grafton and Fairmont, into industri-
al centers. It also contributed to making Wheeling a vibrant
center of commerce, rivaling Pittsburgh. “With the building
of the [B&O Railroad],” wrote historian James Morton
Callahan in 1923, “the trans-Allegheny Northwest became
independent of Richmond. Trade could no longer be 
diverted from Baltimore to Richmond.” He concluded that
this indicates that the “line of business separation was drawn
a quarter of a century before the act of political separation
was accomplished.”    
Of course, many railroads and road improvement 
projects didn’t come cheap and many were financed at least
partly by tax revenue. But the counties of western Virginia
were wary of any project that the eastern legislators might
have been likely to support that mainly benefited the 
southern and eastern parts of the state. 
The tax code tended to favor slave owners at the expense
of eastern farmers by exempting slaves under a certain age
from taxation and nominally taxing the others. Meanwhile,
taxes on land and livestock, assessed at their full value, hit
those in the West hardest. Also, the convention called in
1850 to reform the state constitution — like the one in 1830
— yielded a change that prohibited the state government
from pledging the credit of the state to defray the obliga-
tions of any company or corporation. This effectively put an
end to some government-supported “internal improve-
ments,” such as certain road projects, that the western
delegations were demanding. Later, the tax inequality was
further exacerbated in 1860 when the General Assembly
increased taxes on wool — raised mostly in western Virginia
— while keeping untaxed eastern tobacco and wheat crops.
The Wheeling Conventions
The year after the wool tax was passed as a way to finance
the state’s military mobilization, the state of Virginia voted
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severing ties with the North was far from unanimous.
Indeed, there were even some differences of opinion in the
western counties.
When the “Cotton States” like South Carolina proposed
secession, opinions in the western part of Virginia were 
generally skeptical. Here economic concerns seemed again
to play a role. As Ambler wrote in his 1933 history of the
state: “To West Virginians, Constitutional guarantees were
generally considered sufficient protection for property
rights of all kinds and for other rights as well.”
The chief concern among many was that, in the case of
Virginia’s secession, their own land would be seen as a battle-
ground frontier by the competing armies. Council meetings
in some of the counties resulted in resolutions stating 
adherence to the Union, invoking the Constitution as an
important protection of their prosperity. 
It is worth noting that there was hesitancy over secession
in the eastern parts of Virginia as well. Seven southern states
seceded in late 1860 and early 1861. During this time, eastern
newspapers urged state leaders to take the lead in securing
concessions from the North before considering secession.
This was, reports historians Otis Rice and Stephen Brown,
“a view shared by many Virginians, even those east of the
Blue Ridge.” 
In early 1861, when the secession convention that had
been called by Governor John Letcher had adjourned and
the western delegates had finished their meeting in the
Powhatan Hotel, the fate of Virginia was left in the hands of
voters. The secession ordinance was to come to a vote on
May 23. But some western leaders were urging a preemptive
meeting to consider plans to secede to the Union if the ordi-
nance passed. 
Then, almost as if the intent was to further alienate the
western counties, the Virginia governor instituted on May 11
a ban on shipping flour, grain, pork, beef, or bacon to Ohio
or Pennsylvania. This further drove a wedge between the
economic interests of western Virginians and the political
reality of staying dependent on Virginia.
The counties that largely supported creating a new state
chose the city of Wheeling as the site of their convention
which took place May 13 to May 15. Turning back proposals
to declare their intent to secede before the May 23 vote, the
delegates settled on reconvening on June 11 after the result
of the secession referendum had been established.
Most of the counties of northwestern Virginia voted sub-
stantially against joining the Confederacy, perhaps by as
much as a 3 to 1 vote. There were, however, 11 counties —
mostly in the center of what is known today as West Virginia
— that didn’t favor the Union. These counties were sparsely
populated, but their inclusion in the final boundaries of the
new state wasn’t a foregone conclusion at the time.
As the war progressed, Union forces drove Confederate
soldiers out of the Kanawha and Monongahela Valley by July.
The most pro-Union of the delegates to the final stage of
what became known as the Second Wheeling Convention —
which had initially begun in June — now had momentum at
their back. At its end, the delegates elected Francis Pierpont,
a delegate from Marion County, to be the nominal “gover-
nor” of the new state.
The convention adjourned in late August after deciding
to submit the statehood referendum to a vote on October
24. It passed overwhelmingly — 23 votes in favor for every 1
opposed. All told, 39 counties approved the formation of a
new state. 
ANew State
The boundaries of the new state were still a sticking point
when delegates to a convention called for the purpose of
writing the state’s constitution met again in Wheeling start-
ing in late November 1861. In addition, there were some
sectional issues that arose during this final Wheeling con-
vention as a result of each county’s economic concerns.  
The route of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad was a key
factor in the inclusion of the counties that would become
West Virginia’s eastern panhandle, even though these coun-
ties were generally supportive of the Confederacy. Those
counties — Jefferson, Berkeley, Morgan, Hampshire, Hardy,
and Pendleton — were added only on the condition that vot-
ers approve admission into the new state. Of 11,000 voters,
only 1,610 cast ballots. Only 13 of those votes were against
statehood, leading some to speculate that pro-Confederacy
sentiment was suppressed. (Later legal challenges to the
boundaries of the state — mounted by the eastern pan-
handle counties — were rejected by the Supreme Court 
in 1871.)
Moreover, the counties of the southern part of the state
that had supported Virginia secession from the Union “were
included even against their wishes,” suggests Ambler. 
To safeguard against their future political influence, 
however, he reports that when the constitution was finally
written, their representation in the state legislature was
reduced to a minimum.
All told, 50 counties were included in the state bound-
aries. Five counties (Mineral, Grant, Lincoln, Summers, and
Mingo) were added after statehood.
Another issue concerning government support of infra-
structure projects seemed to mimic the political debates
about why West Virginia should secede from Virginia in the
first place. Delegates from the Kanawha Valley wanted road
and railroad improvements and argued in favor of constitu-
tional authorization for the state to issue bonded debt for
such projects. The northern counties indicated no desire to
include such a provision. When the vote was taken on the
amendment to allow bonding, it was rejected by a vote of 
25 to 23. Alast-minute compromise that allowed the state to
support infrastructure in other ways, including a mechanism
that allowed the creation of specific taxes to pay off new
projects, allowed the convention to end on a note of 
harmony. The constitution also included provisions to elim-
inate classifying property of different types for the sake of
taxation — a response to the offense many took to the favor-
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antebellum days.
In April 1862, voters of the then-fledgling state approved
the new constitution, and in May the new “Restored
Government of Virginia” petitioned the U.S. Congress for
recognition of the state. As Congress deliberated, the Union
was effective at holding the line in West Virginia despite a
few attempts by the Confederate army to capture territory.
Indeed, when the de facto legislature of West Virginia sent
to the Virginia General Assembly a request to secede in May,
it was granted. When Congress finally granted approval in
December and President Lincoln concurred, the only step
to be taken was a referendum terminating slavery in their
territory, which passed handily. 
The state of West Virginia was accepted into the Union
on June 20, 1863. It has the distinction of being one of only
two states formed during the Civil War (the second was
Nevada). Additionally, it was the only state to form by seced-
ing from a Confederate state (though similar proposals were
debated in other states, including North Carolina and
Tennessee). 
Yet, while many of the debates about secessions are 
largely looked upon as epic battles over abolition, West
Virginia’s secession was mainly the result of economic con-
cerns. As Rasmussen notes, those most eager to secede from
the Old Dominion were acting on “an extremely rational
expression of enlightened self-interest.” In retrospect, it’s 
no mystery why the western counties sought to leave
Virginia. Perhaps a more difficult question is why the 
marriage persisted as long as it did. RF
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whether current Fed actions may jeopardize Fed independ-
ence in the future. This recession has spurred new
expansions in the Fed’s loan portfolio, opening up its lending
window to institutions that were not privy to Fed funds
before the economic downturn. Indeed, some have argued
that this has been a long-standing shift in Fed credit policy
that started with lending meant to prop up the Penn Central
Railroad in 1970, the infusion of liquidity the Fed provided
to the failing Continental Illinois National Bank in 
1984, and the engineered bailout of Long-Term Capital
Management in 1998.
Consequently, economist Marvin Goodfriend, formerly
of the Richmond Fed and currently of Carnegie Mellon
University, has proposed a “new accord” for Fed credit 
policy. Meant to mimic what the Treasury-Fed Accord did
for monetary policy, the goal would be to place explicit
boundaries on actions that could harm Fed independence. 
“It’s important to appreciate the difficulties to which the
Fed exposes itself in the pursuit of credit policy initiatives
that go beyond traditional last resort lending to banks,”
notes Goodfriend. Not only does it open the door for more
congressional pressure to lend to some and not to others,
but it also puts the Fed in an untenable position when the
Fed must cooperate with the Treasury on items such as
banking regulation and payments system policy. “This inter-
dependence exposes the Fed to political pressure to make
undesirable concessions with respect to its credit policy ini-
tiatives in return for support on other matters.”
Only time will tell whether the recent expansion in Fed
lending will be temporary or not. In the meantime, it’s
important to understand the historical experience of the
Fed. The independence of the Fed is something that Fed
policymakers still tend to guard closely. Yet it’s not always
the case that independence is taken away all at once as it has
been in previous decades, particularly during wartime. Some
Fed observers and policymakers worry that actions that may
seem well-intentioned and short-lived today could chip away
at Fed autonomy over the long term. RF
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